Abstract-Roaming in wireless mesh networks (WMNs) requires that mobile nodes complete access authentication fast while protecting the identities of mobile nodes. In this paper, after analyzing some current authentication protocols for roaming in wireless mesh networks, we propose a new protocol based on multi-signature and three-party key agreement with a zone-based hierarchical network topology and prove the security properties of the protocol through formal analysis that is based on the strand space model. We also demonstrate the reliability and performance of the proposed protocol through network simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are a new type of wireless network without some restrictions of Ad Hoc networks, wireless local area networks (WLANs), wireless personal area networks (WPANs) and wireless metropolitan area networks (WMANs) for establishing commercial wireless mobile networks. Since a WMN doesn't usually rely on fixed infrastructure and operates in an open area, any user within the range of radio waves can access the network. Access authentication has thus become the first step to prevent unauthorized users from accessing such a network.
The development of wireless technologies has made roaming a more common method of accessing wireless networks. Research on authentication protocols for roaming has thus become very important. Roaming requires that mobile nodes complete access authentication fast while protecting the identities of the mobile nodes. In this paper, we propose an authentication protocol for roaming in WMNs on top of the current 802.1x authentication scheme based on multi-signature and three-party key agreement. We also prove the security properties of the protocol in theory and the reliability and performance of the protocol through simulations.
II. RELATED WORK IEEE P802.11s™/D1.01 provides an Efficient Mesh Security Association (EMSA) authentication scheme based on the IEEE 802.11i standard [1] in which the 802.1x scheme and four-way handshakes are adopted to implement access authentication and key establishment. However, roaming in WMNs isn't adequately addressed in EMSA and, thus, EMSA cannot fully meet the performance and identity protection requirement for roaming. EMSA makes use of EAP [2] , which leads to EAP-SIM, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, PEAP, etc. In EAP-SIM [3] , key management is complicated and the identities of mobile nodes are not well protected. In EAP-TLS [4] , the identities of mobile nodes are not hidden and the protocol requires a two-round interaction between the foreign agent (FA) and the home agent (HA), resulting in a longer delay for authentication. Although EAP-TTLS [5] and PEAP [6] have better expansibility and flexibility, they require even more rounds than EAP-TLS, which obviously result in even longer delay.
Im et al. proposed a secure mutual authentication scheme for roaming services in wireless mobile networks [7] in which a mobile terminal would encrypt a session key using the secret key shared with the HA and forward the message to the HA via the FA who would then attach its digital signature to it. After verifying the FA's signature and authenticating the user's identity by using the shared secret key, the HA will send a reply with its digital signature to the mobile terminal via the FA. Mutual authentication is thus completed. However, since it is transported in plaintext, the identity of the mobile terminal isn't adequately protected. Moreover, since the session keys are encrypted using a secret key, once the secret key is compromised, all session keys become insecure.
Yang et al. proposed a mesh roaming access protocol called EAP-MRAP [8] based on Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement. In the protocol, a mobile node encrypts its identity with the HA's public key in order to hide and protect the identity, and the DH key exchange is implemented to protect the session keys. Since it is assumed that there exists a secure channel between the FA and the HA, necessary authentication of the FA is missing. Furthermore, master key K S is subject to attack since it directly appears in the network when being propagated from the HA to the FA.
III. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL FOR ROAMING
We now propose a new protocol for roaming in WMNs with fewer rounds of interaction and higher security based on several technologies such as hierarchical network topology, multi-signature and three-party key agreement.
A. The Network Model
A zone-based hierarchical network model for WMNs is shown in Fig. 1 in which the dash and the solid lines indicate wireless and wired links, respectively. The whole network consists of one backbone network, one or more local area networks called zones and a number of wired or wireless terminals. In the backbone network, the mesh routers form a mesh infrastructure with self-configuring, self-healing and self-organizing links and there are at least two backbone routers that are connected to the Internet. All backbone routers share a single database that stores authorized certificates. There is an offline certificate authority (CA) supported by an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or a network carrier. The CA connects to the network only when it is notified of the existence of a new terminal user, a new zone router or a new backbone router. The backbone network can be built using different types of radio technologies including the IEEE 802.11 technologies [9] .
Zones are connected to the backbone network through border mesh routers, which enables the integration of existing wireless networks, such as multi-hop networks, Wi-Fi networks, sensor networks, cellular networks, and so on. In each zone, there is at least one mobile node called the access point (AP) that is connected to the backbone, such as mesh access points (MAPs) in multihop networks and microwave towers in cellular networks. Since APs may use different radio technologies, it is therefore required that the backbone border routers support various radio technologies. There is also a database that stores user information, such as user ID, zone ID, authorized key, etc. in each zone. Terminal nodes can roam from one zone to another or hand off from one AP to another in the same or different zones.
Conventional terminals with an Ethernet interface can be connected to mesh routers via Ethernet links, whether wired or wireless. For conventional terminals with the same radio technologies as mesh routers, they can directly communicate with the mesh routers. If different radio technologies are used, terminals must communicate with a zone's AP that has Ethernet connections to the mesh routers. Especially, mesh terminals can access the network through mesh routers or directly meshing with other mesh terminals in multi-hop networks whose routing capabilities can provide improved connectivity and coverage.
We assume that terminals in a zone network communicate with each other within a relatively shorter range and those in a backbone network communicate with each other with a relatively longer range. The cost of communication in the backbone network is higher than that in the zone networks. Each zone network has its own public essentials of DH key agreement that include a large prime number p and the generator g of GF(p) to be used to generate session keys for communication within the network.
Many entities are involved in roaming, including the mobile node (MN), FA, HA, Gateway and the Internet with the network model shown in Fig. 1 . In the roaming model shown in Fig. 2 , MN, FA and HA are located in a zone network while the Gateway is located in the backbone network. We assume that there is already a predefined security association between MN and HA, i.e., MN knows HA's public key and HA knows MN's identity, certificate or secret key. We also assume that both MN and HA know the home zone network's essentials of DH key agreement, i.e., p and g, and that FA and HA can get each other's public-key certificate. 
B. Three-party Key Agreement
We adopt the DH key agreement in our protocol due to the intractability nature of the discrete logarithm problem. In the case of roaming, the longest delay of network communication is between FA and HA since they may be far away from each other, thus requiring relatively longer propagation time for the radio waves. To reduce the number of interaction rounds between FA and HA, we propose a three-party key agreement based on the basic DH algorithm with only one interaction round between them: (1) Table I lists the terms and notations we will use in our roaming authentication protocol in this paper. 
C. Terms and Notations

D. Authentication Flow
Based on the above network model and three-party key agreement algorithm, we propose a new authentication protocol for roaming in WMNs which consists of eight steps as shown in Fig. 3 
z). (6) Known Key Security (KKS): even if an attacker may
know all the previous session keys, the protocol can still guarantee that the current session key is secret. Since session keys are generated using random key genes(x,y,z), previous session keys have no relations with the current session key. (7) No Key Compromise Impersonation (Non-KCI): if a participant's private key is compromised, an attack can only disguise as this participant rather than any others. Mutual authentication of all participants can guarantee this. We compare the security of several protocols in Table  II in which EAP-MRAP is the protocol described in Section II and NEW is our proposed protocol. Table II 
B. Performance
The longest delay of network communication could happen between FA and HA, for they may be far away from each other. In our protocol, there is only one round of communication between FA and HA. Meanwhile, the calculation of modular multiplication and signature algorithm in a three-party DH key agreement takes a relatively longer time.
We can see from Table III that the calculation delay in our protocol is longer than that in the other protocols. However, the calculation delay is usually much shorter compared to the communication delay, especially when the distance of roaming is long, such as between two cities. In addition, modular multiplications of MN can be reduced if pre-computation is adopted. 
V. FORMAL ANALYSIS
Formal analysis is currently one of the most effective ways of analyzing security protocols among which the strand space model [10] is probably one of the most effective formal analysis methods. Strand space model is an analyzing model for security protocols based on the Dolev-Yao model [11] which is built on graph theory and partial ordering and can be used to analyze complicated protocols because of its excellent expansibility. In this section, we formally analyze our proposed protocol with an extended strand space model.
A. Extended Strand Space Model
In the original strand space model, message terms only include atomic terms, encrypted terms and joined terms. Since, in our protocol, we have two new operations, i.e., the signature and the DH operations, we will add some new data collections into the model. 
x is disproved, which results from the NP-hard intractability of the DH operation. Note that the above (4) and (5) are newly added. Definition 3. Besides the original eight attack strands, i.e., M-strand, F-strand, Tee-strand, C-strand, S-strand, Kstrand, E-strand and D-strand, the following two new attack strands are added: (1)  h∈I  g∈M, then gh∈I and hg∈I;
Note that the above (3) is newly defined.
B. Strand Space
Omitting the information that has nothing to do with security in the protocol, the strand space of our protocol as depicted in Fig. 4 is marked as a P-strand Graph. 
There are three regular strands in the protocol: (1) Obviously, mn-strand, fa-strand and ha-strand are not pairwise intersecting.
C. Secrecy
Message m is secret in the strand graph G of a protocol if there is no strand n that meets the two conditions: n∈G and un_term(n)≠m. Proposition 1. Suppose G is a P-strand Graph, ID MN 
A. Simulation Scenario
The simulation scenario is as follows: the network covers an area of 300km×300km; network delay is set at 1 microsecond based on the propagation speed of 300,000km/s for the radio; packet loss ratio is set at 10% in the network according to the average level; processing time for authentication is not considered, for authentication algorithms are optional due to various applications.
As shown in Fig. 5 , the IP network denotes the Internet, foreign subnet denotes the foreign zone network while home subnet denotes the home zone network. Also, as shown in Fig. 6 , mobile nodes labeled as MN01, MN02, … MN50 are located in the foreign zone network which is a part of the foreign subnet, so are the two foreign agents labeled as FA_0 and FA_1. And HA is located in the home subnet. 
B. Results and Analyses
We carried out two groups of simulations in which the number of mobile nodes that request roaming service increases from 1 to 50 with an increment of 1. In the beginning of the first group, all the requesting nodes start randomly within 0.5 second while in the second within 1 second. The total simulation spans 20 seconds and three retries are allowed if an authentication fails. Also, in all the simulation scenarios, one modular multiplication consumes about 0.15 microseconds through experiments.
Through our simulation, we compare (1) the success ratio of authentication to be defined as the number of MNs successfully getting the roaming service divided by the total number of MNs requesting roaming service and (2) the average delay of authentication for all the MNs that get the roaming service.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 7 (1) When the number of MNs requesting for roaming service is relatively small (<13), the success ratios of authentication for both protocols are the same, i.e., 100%. In this case, there is little communication collision as well as packet loss. (2) When the number of MNs requesting for roaming service increases, the success ratio of authentication in our protocol becomes higher than that in EAP-TLS. The failure of authentication is caused by communication collision and packet loss in the network. (3) Average delay of our protocol is much shorter than that of EAP-TLS. Although the calculation time of our protocol is longer, the communication delay is much shorter in our protocol than that in EAP-TLS, which results in lower average delay and also consistent with performance analysis in Section IV.B. (4) As the requesting time increases from 0.5 second to 1 second, both protocols gain a higher success ratio due to less collision. However, our protocol still has a much better performance than EAP-TLS.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented a new authentication protocol for roaming in WMNs and performed formal analysis and simulation experiments to compare our protocol to other similar protocols in this paper. The analysis and experiments show that our protocol has a high performance, availability and security. However, due to its longer calculation delay, our protocol is less advantageous for short-distance roaming in WMNs and is therefore more suitable for a long-distance roaming. In our future research, we will further improve and optimize our protocol.
